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Abstract
Following calls for a more disaggregated approach to studying the consequences of IMF
programs, scholars have developed new datasets of IMF-mandated policy reforms, or
‘conditionality.’ Initial studies have explored how conditions have, inter alia, affected tax
revenues, public sector wages, and health systems. Notwithstanding the important con-
tributions of these studies, a methodological quandary arises as to how to quantitatively
examine the effects of conditionality, as distinct from other aspects of IMF operations
(e.g., credit, technical support, or aid and investment catalysis). In this article, we review
and advance these methodological debates by developing an identification strategy for
addressing the multiple endogenous components of IMF programs. We begin by survey-
ing the main strategies for studying the effects of IMF programs: matching methods,
instrumental variable approaches, system GMM estimation, and variants of Heckman
estimators. We then adapt these methods for studying the effects of conditionality per se.
Specifically, we utilize a compound instrumental variable design over a system of three
equations to address sources of endogeneity related to, first, the IMF participation decision
and, second, the conditions included within the program. In Monte Carlo simulations, we
demonstrate that our approach is unbiased and performs better than alternatives on
standard diagnostics across a range of scenarios. Finally, we apply these methods to
investigate how IMF programs impact government education spending as a share of GDP
on a sample of 132 developing countries for the period 1990 to 2014, finding exposure to
an additional condition results in a 0.05 percentage point decline.
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1 Introduction
Established in 1944, the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) is a cornerstone
institution of global economic governance. Not only is it central to the functioning of
the world economy (Kentikelenis and Seabrooke 2017; Stone 2011; Woods 2006), but
it has also played a decisive role in the long-run developmental trajectory of middle-
and low-income countries (Babb and Kentikelenis 2018; Dreher 2006; Dreher and
Lang 2019; Kentikelenis et al. 2016; Vreeland 2003), affecting the lives of billions in
the process (Babb 2005; Kentikelenis 2017). Unsurprisingly, the institution has invited
controversies, with a track record rarely praised among scholars.1 Among its various
activities, the most contentious has been its practice of conditional lending. According
to its founding charter, the Fund can provide temporary financing under ‘adequate
safeguards’ to countries experiencing balance of payments problems. In exchange for
this support, countries must agree to implement IMF-designed policy reform
packages—or ‘conditionality’—administered through a lending program. These pro-
grams typically last from six months to three years, and loan disbursements are phased
over the duration in tranches, contingent upon the implementation of policy reforms.
The conditionality apparatus of IMF lending programs has two forms: quantitative
and structural conditions (Bird 2009; IMF 2015). The former take the form of quan-
tifiable macroeconomic targets that countries must meet and maintain throughout the
program, such as credit aggregates, international reserves, fiscal balances, and external
borrowing, and make up the majority of conditionality up to the present (Kentikelenis
et al. 2016). Although quantitative conditions may overly restrict governments’ fiscal
policy space, policymakers can pursue a range of alternative policies to meet them; for
example, several types of measures can yield budget deficit reductions. In contrast,
structural conditions clearly specify the means that contribute to meeting the macro-
economic targets and other objectives. They concern a wider range of microeconomic
reforms and afford governments less flexibility. Such reforms have commonly aimed at
altering the underlying structure of an economy; for instance, by privatizing state-
owned enterprises, legislating central bank independence, deregulating labor markets,
or restructuring tax systems (Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
A large body of quantitative research is devoted to understanding the consequences
of IMF programs (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009; Bas and Stone 2014; Dreher 2006;
Nelson and Wallace 2017; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Oberdabernig 2013; Stubbs
et al. 2016). Most of this work has relied on a broad-brush binary indicator for whether
or not a country is under a Fund program in a given year as a measure of the
organization’s engagement—plugging it into regression models and using it to differ-
entiate control and treatment groups. Notwithstanding the important contributions of
these studies, this methodological approach suffers from two major shortcomings. First,
it assumes all IMF programs are identical, while—in practice—they entail heteroge-
neous policy content: some have a wide array of conditions attached, spanning multiple
policy areas (e.g., 126 conditions for Romania in 2004); while others require a very
limited number of measures (e.g. four conditions for Morocco in 2013). Second, the
1 See, for example, the following: Barro and Lee (2005); Blanton et al. (2015); Dreher (2006, 2009); Dreher
and Gassebner (2012); Hartzell et al. (2010); Kentikelenis et al. (2015); Przeworski and Vreeland (2000);
Reinsberg et al. (2018); Stiglitz (2002); Stubbs et al. (2017a, b); and Vreeland (2002, 2003, 2007).
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technique is unable to differentiate the effects of IMF conditionality from other
pathways of program influence; for instance, through credit injections (Dreher 2006),
scaled-up technical assistance and policy advice (Broome and Seabrooke 2015; IMF
2016a), aid and investment catalysis (IMF 2004; Stubbs et al. 2016), and moral hazard
(Dreher and Walter 2010).
While scholars have developed appropriate methodological solutions to analyze the
impact of IMF programs, further advancement of this research agenda has—until
recently—been hamstrung by the lack of disaggregated data on conditionality. Pre-
scient of the fact that these methods might soon reach their frontier, Vreeland (2006)
called for the adoption of such a disaggregated approach to IMF conditionality over a
decade ago. Scholars have responded to this call, assisted by the release of the IMF’s
Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database of conditions and new panel
datasets developed by independent scholars (Beazer and Woo 2016; Caraway et al.
2012; Copelovitch 2010a; Kentikelenis et al. 2016; Rickard and Caraway 2018). Given
this marked increase in the range and detail of data available on conditionality, along
with growing interest in the topic since the controversies surrounding the IMF’s
handling of the global financial crisis (Grabel 2011), the stage is set to undertake
fine-grained quantitative analyses of the impact of conditionality per se. These meth-
odological advances necessitate revisiting established methodologies to examine the
impact of IMF programs.
This article elaborates on how to use panel data on conditionality in IMF programs
to provide quantitative analyses of their effects, focusing on the impact stemming from
the degree of conditionality—that is, the number of conditions applicable either in total,
across condition types (i.e., quantitative or structural), or in a given policy area. We
consider two endogenous components of treatment: (1) countries may select into IMF
programs reflecting, for example, the severity of crises requiring IMF assistance; and
(2) once participating in IMF programs, countries may select (or be selected) into
greater or lesser degrees of conditionality.
Resolving these methodological quandaries allows scholars to test hypotheses and
enrich understandings on the consequences of IMF programs. Does the IMF assist
developing countries to improve their economic or social condition? Did changes in
IMF policies introduced to address criticisms have the intended effects? Debates about
IMF conditionality are, in essence, debates about development and globalization. For
borrowing countries, their policy mix of conditionality determines their mode of
integration into the world economic system and their ability to provide basic services
to their population. Yet, despite such far-ranging implications, much debate has taken
place on the basis of haphazard or inadequate empirical data. Accounting for IMF
program heterogeneity, as endeavored here, is a step to rectifying this gap in our
knowledge.
Our exposition of methodological issues, combined with Monte Carlo simulations,
establishes the efficacy of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) over a system of
three simultaneous equations, in effect combining: (a) a compound instrumental vari-
able approach to account for endogeneity of IMF program participation, using as an
excludable instrument the interaction term of plausibly exogenous time variation in the
budget constraint of the IMF and cross-sectional variation in the average of IMF
program participation across the period of interest; and (b) a compound instrumental
variable approach to account for endogeneity of IMF conditionality, using the
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interaction term of the budget constraint of the IMF and cross-sectional variation in the
average number of conditions a country receives. By including both IMF participation
dummy and conditionality variables, we are able to isolate effects of conditions from
other aspects of IMF operations. We demonstrate the utility of our approach by
applying these methods to examine how IMF programs impact government education
expenditure in a sample of 132 developing countries for the period 1990 to 2014. We
find that exposure to an additional IMF condition results in a 0.08 percentage point
decline in government spending on education as a share of GDP.
The article is structured as follows. The next section reflects on methodological
challenges scholars face when studying the effects of IMF programs and provides an
overview of four main approaches: matching methods, instrumental variable ap-
proaches, system GMM estimation, and variants of Heckman estimators. Section 3
describes our strategy for investigating the effects of IMF conditionality per se.
Section 4 illustrates these methods by examining the effects of IMF conditionality on
government education expenditure. Section 5 reflects on the limitations and broader
relevance of our methodological advances.
2 A review of established methods for studying the impact of IMF
programs
Scholars interested in estimating the effects of IMF programs typically assemble a time-
series cross-section dataset with a large number of countries and years (e.g., all
developing countries for a period spanning two decades), where the unit of analysis
is the country-year. Studies collapse aspects of the IMF’s operations into a binary
indicator coded ‘1’ if a country had an active program in a given year, and ‘0’ otherwise
(Bas and Stone 2014; Dreher 2006; Vreeland 2002). Existing strategies for estimating
the average treatment effect2 of this IMF program participation variable on some
outcome variable—such as economic growth, foreign direct investment, or social
expenditures—all confront the issue of selection bias (Steinwand and Stone 2008).
This form of endogeneity is introduced because the circumstances of countries partic-
ipating in IMF programs are systematically different from those not participating,
which may in turn affect the outcome of interest. While some of these forces are
observable and can thus be included as control variables (e.g., government fiscal
balance or international reserves), other factors—such as political willingness to im-
plement reforms—are not directly observable (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Stone
2008; Vreeland 2003). Failure to account for factors that are correlated with both IMF
participation and the outcome would thus erroneously attribute their effects to IMF
participation. Scholars have employed four strategies to overcome this limitation:
matching methods, instrumental variables approaches, system GMM estimation, and
variants of Heckman estimators.3 We discuss each in turn.
2 The average treatment effect (ATE) refers to the difference in average outcomes between observations (i.e.,
country-years) in the treatment group (IMF program participation) and observations in the control group (no
IMF participation).
3 Steinwand and Stone (2008) provide a comprehensive review of the earlier wave of studies on IMF program
effects that correct for selection bias.
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2.1 Matching methods
Matching seeks to address the issue of selection bias arising from observables by
pairing observations with similar context but different IMF participation status (Atoyan
and Conway 2006). However, it does not offer a solution to selection bias arising from
unobservables since it can only be used when variation between participating and non-
participating countries can be captured by observed covariates (Hardoy 2003). The
advantage of using matching methods is that they do not, in principle, require identi-
fication of a valid instrument (discussed later), and reduce dependence on modelling
and distributional assumptions that accompany parametric approaches (Copelovitch
2010b).
Matching approaches focus on the impact of IMF participation for countries paired
with other countries at a similar likelihood of participation to identify an average
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) (Wooldridge 2010). The ATET can be distin-
guished from an average treatment effect (ATE) insofar as the former identifies the
mean effect of those countries that actually participated in an IMF program, whereas
the latter refers to the impact of a randomly selected country against a counterfactual
non-participation state without considering whether or not the selected country would
ever actually qualify for or be interested in participating in an IMF program in the first
place (Hardoy 2003).
An initial step in the matching procedure is to calculate the probability of partici-
pating in IMF-supported programs conditional on observable economic and political
conditions, estimated via a probit model.4 The next step entails generating matches of
similar probabilities, or propensity scores, between pools of participating and non-
participating observations, or country-years, to construct a control group (Atoyan and
Conway 2006; Bal Gündüz 2016). For instance, if we assume that country selection is
driven only by levels of foreign reserves, then we could match Uganda in 1981 with
Tanzania in 1983. Both cases had low reserves—0.1 times monthly imports—but only
the former country participated in an IMF program. In our hypothetical example,
Uganda in 1981 thus enters the treatment group, while Tanzania in 1983 enters the
control group, in effect acting as a counterfactual Uganda. This process repeats until all
treatment and control country-years are paired. In practice, these matches can be
constructed using various tolerance levels and matching techniques, such as nearest-
neighbor matching, interval matching, or kernel matching (see Morgan and Winship
2007).5 The final step involves calculating the ATET as the difference in means
between treatment and control groups for matched data.
Several studies deploy matching methods to explore the impact of participation in
IMF programs (Atoyan and Conway 2006; Bal Gündüz 2016; Garuda 2000; Hardoy
2003; Nelson and Wallace 2017). For instance, Hardoy (2003) uses nearest-neighbor
4 Matching by propensity score is the traditional and most popular approach, but alternative matching criteria
include index scores or Mahalanobis metrics (Augurzky and Kluve 2007; King and Nielsen 2018).
5 Nearest-neighbor matching—the most commonly deployed matching technique in studies on the effects of
IMF—attempts matches in terms of the absolute distance between their propensity scores, subject to the goal
of minimizing the sum of all distances over all possible sets of matches (Atoyan and Conway 2006). The
choice of tolerance level determines the absolute distance that propensity scores must be equal or less than
before two observations are matched; unmatched observations are excluded from the subsequent ATET
calculation.
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matching to examine the relationship between IMF participation and economic growth,
observing no statistically significant difference across treatment and control groups.
Atoyan and Conway (2006) also employ nearest-neighbor matching in their study of
economic growth, and report no contemporaneous effects of IMF participation. The
authors note that their approach excludes 105 of the 181 IMF participation country-
years due to a lack of matchable nonparticipants, in effect constraining the analysis to a
subsample of countries drawn from the middle of the distribution of propensity scores.
More recently, Bal Gündüz (2016) showed IMF participation is positively associated
with short-term economic growth for low-income countries in a nearest-neighbor
design; and Nelson and Wallace (2017) extend matching procedures in an iterative
algorithm—so-called genetic matching (Diamond and Sekhon 2013)—revealing a
modest but positive effect of IMF participation on the level of democracy.
Despite the merits of this method, important limitations remain. As mentioned, a key
assumption is that all meaningful variation between participating and non-participating
country-years can be captured by observed—or pre-treatment—covariates (Hardoy
2003). Since matching relies only on observable determinants of IMF participation to
generate propensity scores, it can actually accentuate selection bias (Dreher 2006;
Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). Vreeland (2003) explains that
matching methods systematically confuse the effect of participation with unobserved
factors (e.g., political will), which can affect both selection into IMF programs and the
outcome of interest. This selection on unobservables thus contradicts the necessary
assumption for matching to provide consistent estimates when comparing means across
participating and non-participating countries (Bas and Stone 2014). Another limitation
is the inherent trade-off scholars face between minimizing the differences between
matches, which may exclude treatment cases due to incomplete matching, or maximiz-
ing the number of matches, which may result in poor matches for treatment cases
(Atoyan and Conway 2006). With no set benchmark for a suitable level of tolerance,
the decision is at the researcher’s discretion. Further, matching techniques do not
appropriately account for the time-series cross-sectional structure of datasets (Nielsen
and Sheffield 2009), which are often used in analyses of the effects of IMF programs.
In particular, many matching methods match country-year observations rather than
clusters of country-year observations nested within panels, or countries. More gener-
ally, King and Nielson (2018) caution against using propensity score matching as a
method of causal inference entirely, citing inadequacies in the theoretical justification of
its mathematical proof that introduce statistical biases to its results.
2.2 Instrumental variable approaches
A second solution to the problem of endogenous explanatory variables is two- or three-
stage least squares (2SLS or 3SLS) estimation using one or a series of instrumental
variables. To serve as an instrument, a variable must fulfil two criteria: first, the
‘exclusion criterion’ is that it must not affect the outcome except via IMF participation;
second, the ‘relevance criterion’ is that it must be partially correlated with IMF
participation once other exogenous variables have been netted out (Wooldridge
2010). In 2SLS estimation, predicted values are obtained for IMF participation by
regressing it on exogenous variables from the outcome equation and the excluded
instrumental variables. The outcome variable is then regressed on predicted values of
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IMF participation and observed values of exogenous variables. Extending the 2SLS
procedure, 3SLS estimation incorporates information from cross-correlations of error
terms in a system of simultaneous equations for multiple endogenous variables to
produce more efficient parameter estimates (Barro and Lee 2005).6
Past research has relied on a range of political economy variables as instruments for
IMF participation, which vary depending on the outcome of interest (Barro and Lee
2005; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2005; Dreher 2006; Dreher and Gassebner 2012;
Easterly 2005; Moser and Sturm 2011; Oberdabernig 2013; Steinwand and Stone
2008). Most studies rely on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting simi-
larity with the US (Dreher and Gassebner 2012; Steinwand and Stone 2008; Woo
2013); that is, all else equal, countries that vote similarly to the US are more likely to
participate in IMF programs. To act as a valid instrument, voting patterns must
influence IMF participation (Thacker 1999), but not affect the outcome variable except
via IMF participation. Using this instrument, Dreher (2006) shows that IMF participa-
tion reduces growth rates even accounting for endogeneity, and Barro and Lee (2005)
find that greater participation rates in Fund programs reduce economic growth, democ-
racy, and rule of law.
Nonetheless, identifying valid instruments for all possible outcomes of interest
remains a key problem associated with this method. Studies using instruments that
proxy the geopolitical importance of a recipient country assume that the Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE) is representative of all IMF programs, not just the politically
motivated ones (Dreher et al. 2018). In practice, the LATE might not be generalizable,
as politically motivated programs could be less effective. Further, some studies
adopting instruments may breach the exclusion criterion. For example, if the outcome
is democracy then the UNGA instrument is not excludable (Nelson and Wallace 2017),
since democratic states exhibit similar voting patterns to those cast by the US (Carter
and Stone 2015). We also observe a clear breach in a study examining the influence of
IMF participation on social expenditures by deploying international reserves, bilateral
exchange rate, and an exchange rate classification index as instruments (Clements et al.
2013), all of which can affect social spending outside the IMF channel.7 The challenge
of identifying valid instruments is compounded when faced with the additional concern
about the endogeneity of IMF conditionality (discussed later).
2.3 System GMM estimation
System generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimators for dynamic panels
(Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998) have
recently been utilized to allay concerns of endogeneity in IMF participation. Unlike
standard instrumental variable approaches, this method does not assume that valid
6 3SLS uses the 2SLS estimates for each equation in a system of simultaneous equations to obtain an estimate
of the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the errors across the system. A transformed single-
equation representation of the system then yields 3SLS estimates, which are consistent and asymptotically
more efficient than 2SLS estimates (Nsouli et al. 2006).
7 Exchange rates are not excludable because currency depreciation raises the costs of imported drugs and
hospital equipment, which can increase government social spending (Kentikelenis et al. 2015). Likewise,
governments with greater accumulations of international reserves can draw down on them to safeguard social
expenditures during economic downturns (Thomson 2015).
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instruments are available outside the immediate dataset, instead employing internally
derived instruments based on lagged values of levels and differences of IMF partici-
pation. System GMM proceeds by estimating a system of two simultaneous equations:
a ‘differences’ equation—where explanatory variables are first-differences—uses
lagged levels of IMF participation from two or more previous time periods to instru-
ment the contemporaneous change in IMF participation; and a ‘levels’ equation—
where explanatory variables are levels—uses lagged first-differences to instrument
contemporaneous levels of IMF participation (Roodman 2009a, b).
Studies of the consequences of IMF participation have only infrequently relied on
system GMM estimators (Clements et al. 2013; Dreher and Gassebner 2012; Dreher
and Walter 2010; Mukherjee and Singer 2010). Dreher and Walter (2010) found a
negative association between IMF participation and currency crisis, and a positive
association between IMF participation and exchange rate devaluation in response to a
crisis, treating IMF participation and a lagged dependent variable as endogenous. IMF
staff also adopted a system GMM setup to examine the effects of IMF participation on
health and education expenditures, finding a positive effect on spending in low-income
countries (Clements et al. 2013). In their approach, GDP per capita and government
balance were internally instrumented, whereas IMF participation was externally instru-
mented. Additional studies have deployed system GMM only in robustness checks
(Dreher and Gassebner 2012; Mukherjee and Singer 2010).
Despite its advertised flexibility, system GMM estimation makes strong assumptions
about the data generating process. It assumes that the correct model for the outcome is
dynamic (i.e., present changes are a function of past trends), that lagged differences can
predict contemporaneous levels, and that first differences of instruments are uncorre-
lated with country fixed effects (Roodman 2009a, b; Stuckler et al. 2012). However, for
the latter assumption to hold, country fixed effects and first differences of IMF
participation must offset each other across the entire panel. It requires that “throughout
the study period, [countries] sampled are not too far from steady states, in the sense that
deviations from long-run means are not systematically related to fixed effects”
(Roodman 2009b, p. 128). Whether this criterion is fulfilled depends on the sample
of countries and time periods included, but is unlikely to be met in the context of IMF
interventions. An additional limitation is that system GMM estimation is sensitive to
the numerous minutiae—for example, the number of instrument lags, whether they are
collapsed, and whether estimation is one- or two-step—none of which have a clear
theoretical basis when studying IMF participation (Stuckler et al. 2012). As Roodman
(2010) explains, these choices matter: they can make estimates more or less valid, and
they can make certain tests of that validity stronger or weaker. There is also a risk of
over-fitting endogenous variables by introducing too many instruments, thereby failing
to expunge their endogenous components (Roodman 2009a). Roodman (2009a, p. 156)
concludes that “the estimators carry a great and under-appreciated risk: the capacity by
default to generate results that are invalid and appear valid.”
2.4 Variants of Heckman estimators
Heckman variants correct for selection bias by treating non-random assignment of
countries into IMF participating and non-participating groups as an omitted variable
problem (Heckman 1979). In effect, the omitted variable is a catch-all term that
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captures the qualities that make the entity prone to selection. Like instrumental variable
approaches, the appeal of Heckman variants are that they can control for selection on
unobservables, such as political will (Vreeland 2003); yet, they are more efficient than
instrumental variable approaches when the selection variable is dichotomous—such as
IMF participation—rather than continuous (Wooldridge 2015).
Two main variants of Heckman estimators have been deployed in IMF literature: a
standard Heckman model; and the control function approach. Both approaches initially
employ a probit model to predict a country’s IMF participation, thereby generating the
‘inverse-Mills ratio.’8 The participation equation typically requires an ‘exclusion re-
striction’—an excludable instrument that influences selection into IMF programs but
not the subsequent outcome of interest (Lang 2016).9 The inverse-Mills ratio is
subsequently added to the vector of controls in an outcome equation estimated with
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. For Heckman models, the outcome equation
is limited to observations only where the country has selected into the treatment.
Although this approach cannot directly estimate the effect of participating in an IMF
program, it can do so indirectly by estimating another model for observations without
IMF participation, and then calculating the weighted difference for the entire sample of
selection-corrected parameters for countries participating in IMF programs with
selection-corrected parameters for those not participating (Vreeland 2003). Conversely,
a control function approach includes all observations in the outcome equation (i.e.,
regardless of whether or not the country selected into treatment) (Wooldridge 2015),
and can thereby directly estimate the effect of participating in an IMF program. The
approach is frequently mislabeled as a Heckman model in the IMF literature because it
draws on insights from Heckman’s work vis-à-vis the source of omitted variable bias.
Several studies on the effects of IMF programs use variants of Heckman estimators
(Bas and Stone 2014; IEO 2003; Kentikelenis et al. 2015; Mukherjee and Singer 2010;
Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Oberdabernig 2013; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000;
Vreeland 2003). For instance, the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (2003) used a
control function approach to test for the effects of IMF participation on social expenditure,
identifying a positive association. Employing a similar design, Kentikelenis and col-
leagues (Kentikelenis et al. 2015) found IMF participation is associated with higher health
expenditures in sub-Saharan African low-income countries, and with lower health expen-
ditures in low-income countries elsewhere. Investigating the effects of IMF participation
on economic growth, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003) utilized a
Heckmanmodel that corrects both for a country’s decision to request an IMF program and
for the IMF’s decision to approve or reject the request, finding IMF participation lowers
growth rates; however, a more recent study reanalyzed their data and found beneficial
effects on growth when modelling a country’s decision on the expectation of the IMF’s
8 Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003) elaborate on this method by deploying a bivariate
probit design, requiring two participation equations to model the process of IMF participation. This approach
corrects both for country selection into IMF participation and IMF selection of countries to lend to, thereby
adding two separate Inverse-Mills ratios to the vector of controls in the outcome equation.
9 What the IMF literature calls an exclusion restriction is typically referred to as an excludable instrument in
conventional econometric terminology. We favor the term excludable instrument henceforth. Although
Heckman variants that satisfy auxiliary assumptions on the joint distribution of error terms do not strictly
require an excludable instrument, we encourage researchers to follow a conservative approach by deploying
one.
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decision (Bas and Stone 2014). Finally, Oberdabernig (2013) deployed a control function
approach and combined it with Bayesian Model Averaging to demonstrate adverse short-
term effects of IMF participation on poverty and inequality.
Despite widespread use, Heckman variants are not without limitations. The precision
of their estimates depend on the variance of the inverse-Mills ratio, which is determined
by the predictive capacity of the first-stage probit model (Winship and Mare 1992).
That is to say, it depends on having correctly specified the participation equation.
Problems with collinearity of the inverse-Mills ratio may also arise when there is major
overlap in the explanatory variables used in the participation equation and the outcome
equation (Wooldridge 2012). While these concerns are allayed by introducing an
excludable instrument, such a variable may not be readily available (Sartori 2003).10
A final drawback is that country fixed effects cannot be introduced to the first-stage
probit model, due to the well-known incidental parameter problem (Greene 2004).11
On balance, while none of the methods are without limitations, we maintain that
some clearly perform better than others in dealing with the problem of selection bias.
Matching methods are the least palatable option due to their inability to address
selection on unobservables. We also discount system GMM estimation because it
carries stringent assumptions that are untenable in all but the most exceptional of
circumstances; besides, the estimates are too sensitive to arbitrary changes in the model
to inspire confidence. We are thus left with instrumental variable approaches and
Heckman variants. Both approaches entail the pursuit of a variable that fulfils exclusion
and relevance criteria (i.e., an excludable instrument). Here, we prioritize the minimi-
zation of potential bias that could be introduced by excluding country fixed effects in
the first-stage equation over the gains in efficiency that Heckman variants achieve for
dichotomous variables like IMF participation. We thus opt for instrumental variable
approaches as our favored strategy. Nonetheless, because researchers may view this
potential bias as negligible in their context, we also consider the more efficient control
function approach below.
3 Adapting methods for studying the effects of conditionality
Notwithstanding voluminous literature on the IMF and its conditional lending, until
recently scholars lacked systematic, transparent, and replicable data on the actual policy
content of its programs. Assuming the unit of analysis as the country-year, quantitative
studies relied on dummy variables that measure the presence of an IMF program in a
given year. At a conceptual level, there are two main concerns with this approach. First,
such work obscures countries’ diverging experiences with IMF programs, which are
10 Sartori (2003) develops an estimator for binary-outcome selection models without excludable instruments,
but notes that the rationale for needing an excludable instrument in Heckman approaches applies to both
binary and continuous outcomes.
11 Conditional logit estimation would allow for the inclusion of fixed effects in a binary response model while
avoiding incidental parameter bias. However, it cannot be used in a multi-equation framework because its
errors have an extreme-value distribution; whereas the multi-equation estimator we introduce in this article
assumes a multivariate normal distribution. Conditional logit thus cannot be used unless the researcher wants
to extract the endogenous component of either IMF participation or conditionality, as in previous work
(Dreher et al. 2009).
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designed ad hoc and thereby entail heterogeneous policy content not accurately
captured by a binary variable (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). The empirical approach
therefore implicitly sides with critics accusing the IMF of ‘one size fits all’ policies
(Stiglitz 2002), despite the strong rejection of this claim by the organization (Dawson
2002). Second, these studies cannot isolate the effects of conditionality from alternative
channels of program influence. These include, inter alia, scaled-up technical assistance
and policy advice (Broome and Seabrooke 2015; IMF 2016a), aid catalysis (IMF 2004;
Stubbs et al. 2016), and moral hazard (Dreher and Walter 2010). It is possible, for
instance, that the impact of conditionality diverges from the impact of other aspects of
IMF operations.
Scholars face additional endogeneity concerns when the variable of interest is IMF
conditionality and not IMF program participation per se. While existing research has
already established that countries select into IMF participation—a form of bias that the
methods above attempt to parse out—what is less apparent is whether countries also
select into conditions (Vreeland 2006). No academic consensus exists concerning
whether conditions are requested by countries (Caraway et al. 2012; Rickard and
Caraway 2014; Vreeland 2006), or imposed by IMF staff on unwilling borrowers
(Chang 2007; Grabel 2011; Simmons et al. 2008; Stiglitz 2002). For proponents of
the former argument, certain conditions may be sought by governments to gain
leverage over domestic opposition to policy change (Vreeland 2006). The latter line
of argument perceives conditionality as a coercive instrument at the disposal of the
IMF, used to compel countries into implementing reforms they may not otherwise wish
to undertake (Simmons et al. 2008). Where there is agreement is that the circumstances
of countries receiving more IMF conditions are systematically different from those
receiving fewer conditions. Indeed, several studies find that both domestic political
conditions in the borrowing country and international strategic factors influence con-
ditionality (Caraway et al. 2012; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Dreher et al. 2009, 2015;
Gould 2003; Stone 2008). Chwieroth (2015) and Nelson (2014) also show that
conditionality varies as a function of the professional ties and shared beliefs between
IMF staff and borrowing-country officials. Yet, ambiguity remains as to whether these
underlying differences would subsequently affect the outcome of interest.
We know of only 11 quantitative studies that examine the effects of IMF condition-
ality as distinct from IMF program participation, summarized in Table 1. These studies
are yet to converge around a single method for addressing possible endogeneity
biases.12 Indeed, three of the 11 studies do not provide any treatment for endogeneity
of conditionality (Rickard and Caraway 2018; Stubbs et al. 2017b; Woo 2013). It is
also worth noting that these studies vary in the effect they wish to capture: five include
an IMF participation variable in addition to the IMF conditionality variable, thereby
capturing the total effect—or ATE—of IMF intervention (Bulír and Moon 2004;
Chapman et al. 2017; Crivelli and Gupta 2016; Stubbs et al. 2017b; Wei and Zhang
2010); whereas six restrict analyses of conditionality to observations with IMF partic-
ipation only, thereby capturing the conditioned effect—or ATET—of IMF intervention
12 Although we focus on studies examining effects of IMF conditionality, scholarship on the World Bank and
regional development banks face the same methodological quandary surrounding the estimation of effects of
conditionality as distinct from program participation (e.g., Smets and Knack 2016). These studies are also yet
to converge around a single method for resolving this empirical challenge.
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(Beazer and Woo 2016; Casper 2017; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Ivanova et al. 2006;
Rickard and Caraway 2018; Woo 2013). The latter option is intuitive, and yields
findings that are easier to interpret, since one need only consider the effect of IMF
conditionality variables. However, it also means that results can only be interpreted
within the context of country-years with an IMF program, in turn offering a more
limited set of policy implications surrounding IMF program design more generally.
Furthermore, using a restricted sample of the treated still does not absolve the require-
ment to address selection bias into a program, for instance by including the inverse-
Mills ratio (Heckman 1979), nor account for endogeneity of conditionality.
If one wishes to distinguish effects of conditionality from other aspects of IMF
programs, but is also interested in how this compares to cases without an IMF program,
then both a measure of conditionality and a binary indicator for IMF participation should
be included in the model. IMF conditionality has been measured on three dimensions:
degree, or the number of conditions applicable either in total or within a given policy
area; scope, or the total number of policy areas subject to conditionality; and depth, or
the relative stringency of each of the conditions (IEO 2007; Kentikelenis et al. 2016;
Stone 2008). We limit our analysis to the degree of conditionality, which scholars use as
a proxy for the overall burden of conditionality (Copelovitch 2010a; Dreher and Jensen
2007; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Gould 2003). This measure is admittedly imperfect
because it does not capture the difficulty in implementing any individual condition
(Dreher et al. 2015). In any case, it may be impossible to measure the difficulty of
individual conditions, especially given the vastly different characteristics of IMF bor-
rowers: the same condition in one domestic institutional environment could be easier to
implement compared to another environment (Copelovitch 2010a). Coding condition
depth entails a substantial—and, in our view, unacceptable—level of subjectivity.13
3.1 Accounting for multiple endogenous IMF variables
We proceed under the assumption that countries select into both IMF participation and
conditionality. Our proposed solution is to utilize maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
over a system of three simultaneous equations, in effect combining an instrumental
variable approach to address endogeneity of participation with an instrumental variable
approach to address endogeneity of conditionality. If all equations are linear then in theory
3SLS estimation could be used, but since we require greater flexibility due to non-linearity
in the IMF program equation, we opt for MLE instead. We subsequently deliberate on
plausibly excludable instruments for both IMF variables, before assessing the perfor-
mance of our strategy in Monte Carlo simulations. Our unit of analysis throughout is the
country-year, using time-series cross-sectional data. The methods we propose are adapt-
able to the inclusion of either a count of all conditions or multiple policy area counts;
though, for the sake of parsimony, we focus on the total effect of all conditions.
dIMFPROGit ¼ γ1X it þ γ2Zit þ μi þ δt ð1Þ
13 The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (2007) attempted to measure the difficulty of implementation for
conditions based on whether parliamentary approval was required; however, we found this criterion too
insensitive and, regardless, arbitrary in its own right.
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dIMFCONDit ¼ α1X it þ α2Y it þ μi þ δt ð2Þ
Wit ¼ β1 dIMFPROGit þ β2 dIMFCONDit þ β3X it þ μi þ δt þ εit ð3Þ
Here, i is country and t is year. Equation (3) is the outcome equation, where W is the
outcome of interest; dIMFPROG is the fitted value for IMF participation derived from
Equation (1); dIMFCOND is the fitted value for the number of conditions derived from
Equation (2);X denotes a vector of controls; μ is a set of country dummies; δ is a set of year
dummies; and ε is the error term.14 Equation (1) is a linear model to obtain predicted values
of IMF participation, dIMFPROG. It is assumed to be a function of X, a list of covariates
from the outcome equation; Z, an excludable instrument; μ, a set of country dummies; and
δ, a set of year dummies. Equation (2) obtains the predicted values for IMF conditionality,dIMFCOND. It is also a function of X, μ, and δ; as well as, Y, another excludable instrument.
As discussed earlier, both instrumental variable approaches and variants of Heckman
estimators can control for selection on unobservables into IMF program participation. A
variation on Equation (1) is to thus use a control function approach instead, which is more
efficient but will not allow for the inclusion of country fixed effects, μi.
15 In this setting,
the predicted probabilities of IMF participation can be obtained from a probit model.
To implement these analyses, we need a flexible estimator for multi-equation econo-
metric models that can accommodate non-linearity if need be (i.e., if researchers choose to
use a control function approach). MLE is suitable for this purpose and can be implement-
ed in the cmp module for Stata, which allows us to jointly estimate the covariates of W,dIMFPROG, and dIMFCOND. The procedure produces consistent estimates under the
assumption that the system is recursive and errors follow a multivariate normal distribu-
tion. It allows for arbitrary cross-equation correlation of errors, and clustered standard
errors using the bootstrap. Details on how the model is jointly estimated, including the
theoretical properties of the estimator and its distributional assumptions, are available in
Roodman (2011) and further detailed in our supplementary online appendices.16
3.2 Identifying excludable instruments
The perennial challenge of instrumental variable and control function approaches is
finding observable variables that affect the endogenous variables the scholar wishes to
instrument—here, the number of conditions applicable and the decision to participate in
a program in the first place—but not the outcome variable, except via the impact on
14 This model can accommodate varying lag structures for right-hand variables, the appropriateness of which
will depend on theoretical expectations and the outcome of interest. For instance, some studies enter IMF
variables lagged one year to correspond with the budget cycle (Crivelli and Gupta 2016); while others suggest
lags of either zero, one, or two years may be appropriate depending on the effect pathways one purports to
measure (Oberdabernig 2013). There may be instances where researchers wish to test on even deeper lags
where effects are expected to unfold only after a substantive period of time has elapsed.
15 Conditional logit estimation would allow for the inclusion of fixed effects in a binary response model while
avoiding incidental parameter bias. However, its error distribution is incompatible with the assumptions
required for multi-equation MLE. Unlike conditional logit, the latter model affords the flexibility to extract
the endogenous components of both IMF programs and IMF conditionality.
16 The online appendices are available on The Review of International Organizations’ website.
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conditionality and participation respectively. To overcome this issue, we develop a new
instrument for IMF conditionality, before assessing potential instruments for IMF
participation used in previous studies.
For conditionality, we repurpose a recently popularized compound instrumentation
approach from the aid effectiveness literature (Dreher and Langlotz 2017; Nunn and
Qian 2014). Specifically, our instrument is the interaction of the within-country average
of the number of conditions across the period of interest with the year-on-year IMF’s
budget constraint. Formally specified, the predicted values for IMF conditionality
specified in Equation (2) are derived as follows:
dIMFCONDit ¼ α1 IMFCONDi IMFBUDGt
 
þ α2X it þ μi þ δt ð4Þ
Here, i is country and t is year. dIMFCOND is the fitted number of IMF condi-
tions; IMFCOND

is the country-specific average of conditions; IMFBUDG is the
budget constraint of the IMF in year t; X is a list of covariates from the outcome
equation; μ is a set of country dummies; and δ is a set of year dummies.
The identifying assumption of Equation (4) is that the outcome of interest in countries
with different exposure to conditionality will not be affected differently by changes in
the IMF’s budget constraint other than through the impact of IMF conditions. This
econometric strategy is supported in analytical proofs by Bun and Harrison (2018) and
Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) that show the interaction of an endogenous variable
with an exogenous one can be interpreted as being exogenous under mild assumptions.
The approach is akin to a (continuous) difference-in-difference design: the effect of
conditionality on the outcome of interest is compared across a group of high-exposure
countries to IMF conditions and a group of low-exposure countries as the IMF’s budget
constraint changes. As in any difference-in-difference design, identification rests on an
exogenous treatment and the absence of different pre-trends across groups. Below we
discuss these assumptions, along with the usual assumptions on instrumental variables.
The instrument fulfils the relevance criterion because the cross-sectional average of
conditionality approximates the general propensity of a country to obtain a specific
amount of conditions in any given year, after accounting for observable factors that
usually explain such variation. Furthermore, as previous research shows, the number of
conditions increases when country demand for IMF loans grows, and decreases or
stagnates when country demand for IMF loans is weak (Chapman et al. 2017; Dreher
and Vaubel 2004). A plausible rationale for the observed relationship between the number
of conditions and country demand is that as the IMF assists more countries, resource
scarcity prompts the organization to assign a greater number of conditions to any given
country as a safeguard measure for loan repayments (Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Vreeland
2003). The inverse also holds: Lang (2016) shows that the IMF is more generous with its
loans when it has high liquidity, implying less conditions in times of resource abundance
as the Fund becomes more eager to recruit borrowers, anticipating interest revenues on
loans (Babb and Buira 2005).17 This line of argument is underpinned by the idea that the
17 Vreeland’s (2003) conditionality game shows that more conditions decrease country demand for IMF loans,
so it would be rational for the IMF to reduce the number of conditions if it wishes to entice countries to
borrow.
How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality
IMF is, at least to some degree, a self-serving international bureaucracy that seeks to
maximize revenues, protect future budgets, and maintain a position of global power
(Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Vaubel 1996).
In our analysis, the budget constraint is measured via proxy using the natural log of
the IMF’s liquidity ratio—calculated as liquid resources divided by liquid liabilities
(Lang 2016; Nelson and Wallace 2017). Here, liquid resources is the sum of usable
currencies plus Special Drawing Rights contributed; and liquid liabilities is the sum of
members’ reserve tranche positions plus outstanding IMF borrowing from members
(Lang 2016). Figure 1 plots the natural log of IMF liquidity ratio and the mean number
of conditions per participating country in a year for 1990 to 2014, showing a significant
correlation between the two variables (r =−.30). In regressions further below, the
instrument consistently satisfies benchmarks for identifying strong instruments, with
a Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic above ten (Staiger and Stock 1997).
The instrument fulfils the exclusion criterion because country-specific changes in
conditionality that deviate from its long-run average are brought about only by
decisions of the IMF that do not pertain to any given country, such as the introduction
of social spending floors in the late-1990s or the streamlining initiative of the early-
2000s (IMF 2001a; Kentikelenis et al. 2016). While one might be concerned about
potential direct effects of the general propensity of a country to obtain a specific amount
of conditions in any given year on the outcome variable, we control for this effect
through the inclusion of country fixed effects in both conditionality and outcome
equations (Dreher and Langlotz 2017). Moreover, there is no apparent pathway from
the IMF’s own budget constraint to an outcome variable of a given country other than
through conditionality, since it is driven by organizational factors that have nothing to
do with the characteristics of borrowing countries.
There could be a question on the exogeneity of the budget constraint insofar as wealthy
member countries can replenish IMF resources in response to a greater number of
countries participating in programs, which would diminish the Fund’s risk aversion such
Fig. 1 IMF liquidity ratio and mean number of conditions per year, 1990–2014
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that the organization is willing to agree to fewer conditions when bargaining a new
program with a recipient country (Dreher and Vaubel 2004). This logic is flawed,
however, because the amount of financial resources that members commit to the Fund
is determined by exogenous institutional processes: set by the IMF’s Board of Governors
following quota reviews conducted every five years (IMF 2017a). It is therefore unlikely
that IMF resource increases would then be linked to the outcome through unobserved
channels (Lang 2016).
A related concern over instrument excludability is that donors may be less willing to
spend in times of global financial crisis, resulting in both a reduction of the IMF’s
concessionary lending budget—which, unlike its non-concessionary account, is
replenished through voluntary contributions from member countries rather than quota
subscriptions (IMF 2016b)—and deteriorating socio-economic outcomes in aid dependent
countries. The inclusion of year dummies in both conditionality and outcome equations can
capture common external shocks across all countries, and will ensure that the instrument is
not correlated with the error term in the outcome equation (Nunn and Qian 2014). In
essence, our identification strategy relies on “the interaction term being exogenous condi-
tional on the baseline controls” (Nunn and Qian 2014, p. 1632 emphasis added).
Another potential concern over instrument excludability derives from the underlying
bargaining process that determines conditionality (Dreher and Vaubel 2004). It is possible
that the within-country average of the number of conditions reflect levels of country
‘priority’ within the IMF insofar as it relates to geopolitics or risk aversion. For instance,
geopolitically important countries have greater bargaining power and may thus receive
fewer conditions on average than less geopolitically important countries (Stone, 2002,
2011). If the elasticity of conditionality with regard to the IMF budget constraint also
depends on political priority, such that low-priority countries see their conditionality
increase faster than high-priority countries when IMF resources become scarce, then the
exclusion criterion would be violated through the correlation between the instrument and
the unobserved variable ‘priority’. To test if this is the case, in Fig. 2 we divide countries
into low, medium, and high conditionality groups and graph the IMF liquidity ratio
against the number of conditions assigned to a specific country for each year of IMF
participation. Countries at different burdens of conditionality have, on average, a similar
propensity of receiving more conditions when the amount of countries in IMF programs
increases, as indicated by equivalent gradients of the lines of best fit across conditionality
groups (all between r =−.15 and r =−.29). We thus show that the elasticity of condi-
tionality with respect to geopolitical importance is approximately constant; that is to say,
the instrument satisfies the homogeneity of treatment assumption necessary for the
exclusion criterion to be valid (Hainmueller et al. 2016).
Finally, since the above approach is akin to a difference-in-difference design, non-
parallel trends across groups with different exposure would undermine identification
(Christian and Barrett 2017). In our case, trends over time in the number of IMF conditions
and the outcome variable should be similar across above-mean conditionality exposure and
below-mean conditionality exposure groups of countries. In addition, inference would be
threatened if there was a non-linear trend in the time-varying part of the compound
instrument that is similar to the respective trends in the potentially endogenous variable
and the outcome variable in the high-exposure group of countries. This is because such
non-linear parallel trends would create spurious correlation not controlled for by year fixed
effects unless the same non-linear trends are also present among the low-exposure group of
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countries (Christian and Barrett 2017). In our case, we would be concerned about similarly
shaped non-linear trends in the IMF liquidity ratio, the number of IMF conditions, and
education expenditure if these trends only occur among high-exposure countries but not the
low-exposure countries. We graphically assess these two conditions below.
Figure 3 allows us to compare trending behavior across exposure groups for the
mean number of conditions (left panel) and our outcome variable of government
education spending as a share of GDP (right panel). The trend pattern for the
number of conditions is qualitatively similar across groups, although the high-
exposure countries face a higher number of conditions by definitional fiat in any
given year. We also find similar trends across exposure groups in the outcome
variable. In Fig. 4, we present the temporal evolution of the IMF liquidity ratio.
Here we observe no similar (non-linear) trends between the IMF liquidity ratio and
the mean number of conditions, or between the IMF liquidity ratio and education
expenditures. Consequently, there is no apparent violation of the design assump-
tions of the difference-in-difference approach.
Fig. 2 IMF liquidity ratio and number of conditions per country-year for low, medium, and high condition-
ality countries, 1990–2014. Notes: Excludes country-years without a condition. Countries divided into three
equal groups based on a country’s average number of conditions per year of IMF participation. Low
conditionality (0 to 25.9 conditions) countries includes Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Jordan,
Kenya, Korea Rep., Kosovo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zimbabwe. Medium conditionality
(25.9 to 30.9) includes Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Burundi,
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Georgia,
Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Papua
New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia. High conditionality (30.9 to 62.7) includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chad, Congo Dem. Rep., Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Greece, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao,
Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritania, Moldova, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra
Leone, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen
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Overall, we believe that the argument for using the interaction of the within-country
average of the number of conditions and the year-on-year IMF budget constraint as an
instrument is well grounded. To violate the exogeneity assumption, one would have to
find an unobserved variable driving the relationship between the time-variant IMF
budget constraint and the outcome of interest; and such an unobserved variable would
also need to be correlated with the country-specific average of conditionality after
controlling for country and year fixed effects and a vector of controls. Although it is
unlikely that such a variable exists, we consider this possibility by incorporating
plausible candidate variables for our particular outcome of interest as additional controls
in robustness checks, namely education commitments of overseas development assis-
tance and the number of role-equivalent countries participating in IMF programs in the
past three years. Furthermore, to violate the parallel and non-overlapping trends as-
sumptions, the contemporaneous trends in the outcome of interest would have to follow
different patterns across groups of countries with high compared to low exposure to IMF
conditionality, and the trends in the IMF’s budget constraint, IMF conditionality, and the
outcome of interest would need to overlap (Christian and Barrett 2017).
Excludable instruments are also needed to account for endogeneity of IMF partic-
ipation. As described in Section 2.2, past studies usually rely on UNGA voting
similarity with the US (Dreher and Gassebner 2012; Steinwand and Stone 2008;
Woo 2013), but the LATE of the instrument might not be generalizable since politically
motivated programs could be less (or more) effective (Dreher et al. 2018). Our
preferred approach is thus to use another compound excludable instrument initially
proposed by Lang (2016) and adopted more recently by Nelson and Wallace (2017):
the interaction of the within-country average of IMF program participation across the
period of interest with the year-on-year IMF’s budget constraint, again using the natural
log of the IMF liquidity ratio as a proxy.
Formally specified, the predicted values for IMF participation specified in Equation
(1) are derived as follows:
Fig. 3 Parallel trends in IMF conditionality compound instrument
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dIMFPROGit ¼ y1 IMFPROGi IMFBUDGt
 
þ y2X it þ μi þ δt ð5Þ
Here, i is country and t is year. dIMFPROGit is the predicted probability of IMF
participation; IMFPROG

is the country-specific average of participation; IMFBUDG
is the budget constraint of the IMF in year t; X is a list of covariates from the outcome
equation; μ is a set of country dummies; and δ is a set of year dummies.
Lang (2016) provides a robust defense of the instrument’s excludability, which
follows the same logic as our IMF conditionality instrument vis-à-vis the exogenous
variation of the budget constraint. Again, since such an approach is akin to a
(continuous) difference-in-difference design, we check below whether its underlying
assumptions hold.
In Fig. 5, we find both exposure groups to be similar in terms of their trending patterns
with respect to the outcome variable and the mean probability of IMF program partici-
pation. Furthermore, there is no apparent trend similarity between the IMF’s budget
constraint (see Fig. 4) and the mean probability of IMF program participation and
education expenditure, respectively, among above-mean participation exposure countries.
3.3 Performance assessment of estimators using Monte Carlo simulation
While the proposed multi-equation approach with correlated errors is preferable on a
theoretical basis, its performance relative to alternative approaches needs to be tested.
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations, which enable us to control the data generating
process and thereby assess how well different estimation methods approximate the true
parameter values.
Building on our theoretical discussion, we compare the performance of six estima-
tors: our favored double-instrumental variable maximum-likelihood estimator that
essentially linearizes the IMF participation equation to include fixed effects, akin to a
3SLS estimator, which accounts for endogeneity of IMF programs and conditionality
(IV/IV/MLE); a conditional mixed process maximum-likelihood estimator that
Fig. 4 IMF liquidity ratio across time, 1990–2014
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accounts for endogeneity of IMF programs and conditionality but does not linearize the
IMF participation equation (CFA/IV/MLE); a two-step variant of Heckman estimator
using a control function approach without correcting for endogeneity of conditionality
(CFA/−/OLS); a 2SLS estimator correcting for endogeneity of IMF programs through a
linearized IMF selection equation but with no correction for conditionality (IV/−/OLS);
a 2SLS estimator without endogeneity correction for programs but with correction for
endogeneity of conditionality through an instrumental variable approach (−/IV/OLS);
and a simple OLS estimator without any endogeneity correction (−/−/OLS). We
scrutinize these estimators across several scenarios. In the first five scenarios, we match
the proposed data-generation process but vary cross-equation correlations and the
strength of the instruments. In the last two scenarios, we probe robustness of the
estimators to omitted-variable bias that jointly affects IMF treatments and the outcome
of interest. For each simulation scenario, the data are generated and models estimated
500 times, and three quantities are calculated: bias, root mean square error, and
optimism (Bell and Jones 2015).18
We find that our proposed solution—instrumenting for both IMF treatments in a
multi-equation framework with joint error structure—is the preferred one unless instru-
ments are weak. Whether CFA/IV/MLE is preferable to IV/IV/MLE, however, depends
on the specific parameterization. For example, CFA/IV/MLE performs best when a
strong instrument for IMF conditions is available, when there is high residual correla-
tion across equations, and when the model is misspecified by ignoring a confounder
18 We implement the simulation as follows. First, in each replication loop, we create a rectangular dataset of
1000 observations. Second, we generate the normally-distributed predictors, instruments, and errors, and
calculate the response variables. The instrument is defined such that it correlates with the main predictor but
also includes white noise, which simulates instrument weakness. Third, we run the analysis using six different
estimators in each of the seven scenarios, calculating for each coefficient estimate its bias, mean squared error,
and optimism with respect to the true parameter. For detailed descriptions and results tables please refer to the
online appendices.
Fig. 5 Parallel trends in IMF participation compound instrument
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that affects both IMF programs and the outcome of interest. Conversely, IV/IV/MLE
performs well (and slightly better than CFA/IV/MLE) when both instruments are strong
and cross-equation correlation is mild, and in the misspecified case where a third
variable causes both IMF conditions and the outcome. Our simulations also suggest
conditions under which simpler alternatives underperform. Plain OLS is particularly
poor when the model is misspecified. In this case, the bias concentrates in the
coefficient of the IMF treatment with unobserved correlation with the outcome. A
similar result holds when conditionality is instrumented but the researcher ignores
selection into IMF programs. Likewise, when only IMF programs are instrumented
but not IMF conditions, results are severely biased under a misspecified model. In this
case, a control function approach performs relatively better than a linearized IV model
for program selection, but both have unacceptable biases. Only when both instruments
are weak, such estimators yield less biased results than the more complex double-
instrumentation estimators that our approach uses. In sum, we find that CFA/IV/MLE
and IV/IV/MLE are virtually unbiased across a wide range of scenarios and perform
best in most cases on root mean squared error and optimism diagnostics. We take this as
evidence of the superiority and robustness of our proposed estimator where problems of
program selection and endogeneity of conditionality are intertwined. However, a caveat
when applying these approaches is that moderately strong instruments are necessary.
Failing that, simpler alternatives such as OLS are more robust—as confirmed by recent
methodological literature (Young 2018).
Overall, our recommended approach has the advantage of enabling scholars to
account for program heterogeneity and to separate the effects of conditionality from
other aspects of IMF operations, while addressing potential endogeneity concerns
surrounding the IMF variables. Our approach is also flexible enough to accommodate
disaggregated counts of conditions (see below).
4 An empirical application to government education spending
To illustrate the utility of our proposed method, we present an empirical application
where government education expenditure is the outcome variable. This issue has been
the subject of sustained controversy, as critics argue that IMF programs result in cuts to
funding earmarked for education (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006), while the IMF
retorts that its programs safeguard such expenditure (Clements et al. 2013; IEO
2003). Previous studies utilized a dummy variable to measure the presence of a
Fund-supported program, thereby masking diverse country experiences (Clements
et al. 2013; Huber et al. 2008; IEO 2003; Nooruddin and Simmons 2006). We
overcome this limitation by examining whether the number and type of conditions
affect spending.
4.1 Pathways
We posit three pathways linking IMF conditionality to government education expen-
diture. These invoke both types of conditions: the quantifiable macroeconomic targets
that make up the majority of conditionality (‘quantitative conditions’); and the micro-
economic reforms aimed at altering the underlying structure of an economy (‘structural
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conditions’). A further three pathways pertain to IMF operations outside of the
conditionality channel.
First, structural conditions that explicitly call for restructuring of the education sector
may either increase or decrease education expenditure. For instance, the Nicaraguan
program in 1999 required “management by local boards of 95 percent of secondary
schools and 65 percent of primary schools” (IMF 2000b); Bolivian officials agreed in
2000 to “develop a reform proposal for higher education in order to reduce the share of
public resources for higher education” (IMF 1999); and the Azerbaijani program called
for authorities to “establish special government commissions to develop reform plans
for the health and education sectors” in 1997 (IMF 1997).
Second, structural conditions that directly stipulate education sector hiring decisions
can reduce government education spending. Examples abound: Bulgaria’s program in
2006 required “an employment cut of at least 5,500 positions in the education sector”
(IMF 2006); Sierra Leone had to “implement concrete measures to control the teachers’
payroll” in 2002 (IMF 2002); and in 2004 Tajikistan was required to “reduce the
number of employees in the education sector by 5 percent” (IMF 2003). By the same
token, quantitative conditions stipulating general—rather than education-specific—
wage bill limits on the public sector can indirectly impede a borrowing country’s
ability to hire and remunerate teachers (Marphatia 2010). In West Africa alone, between
1995 and 2014 a combined 95 of the 211 years with IMF conditions included limits to
the wage bill (Stubbs et al. 2017b).
Third, quantitative conditions set by the IMF in the majority of its programs on
budget deficit reduction, international reserve holdings, and net domestic borrowing
can shrink fiscal space, indirectly forcing a reduction in spending in the education
sector (Kentikelenis et al. 2016; Stubbs and Kentikelenis 2018). While IMF staff claim
that quantitative conditions stipulating floors on social expenditures reverse this drag on
education spending (Clements et al. 2013; IMF 2017b), recent research shows that
these floors are observed infrequently, whereas fiscal deficit targets are almost always
met (Kentikelenis et al. 2016).
These initial three pathways are represented empirically with a series of IMF
conditionality variables (see below). Outside of conditionality channels, the IMF may
also bolster government education expenditure via—fourth—the provision of low
interest credit provided under its programs, although this additional resource is some-
times used to repay external debt instead (Gould 2003). Fifth, the presence of IMF
programs may give countries a ‘stamp of approval’ that could catalyze additional
bilateral aid from donor governments, thus boosting education expenditures through
donor financing (Clements et al. 2013). Even so, evidence elsewhere shows this aid
substitutes—rather than complements—government spending on the social sector, and
that aid flows increase for general budget support and debt relief but not for education
(Stubbs et al. 2016; Stuckler et al. 2011). Sixth, scaled-up technical assistance can
improve budget monitoring and execution, thus increasing the proportion of the
education budget commitment that is actually spent on the education sector, rather
than being spent elsewhere or going unspent (Stubbs et al. 2017b). For instance, the
IMF prioritized assistance to improve the utilization of social sector appropriations in
Benin in the late-1990s (IMF 1998), ultimately contributing to higher social spending
(IMF 2000a). These subsequent three pathways are captured in our analysis by an IMF
participation variable.
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4.2 Variables
We investigate the effects of IMF conditionality on government education spending as
a share of GDP for 132 developing countries over the period 1990 to 2014, as reported
by the World Bank (2016). Our IMF conditionality variables are based on the coding of
agreements between the Fund and its borrowers (Kentikelenis et al. 2016). The online
appendices provide further details on how the dataset was created. We only count
binding conditions (known as ‘prior actions’ or ‘performance criteria’), following
established procedures in this field of study (Copelovitch 2010a; Rickard and
Caraway 2014; Stubbs et al. 2017b; Woo 2013).19 Binding conditions directly deter-
mine scheduled disbursements of loans and must be implemented for the program to
continue; whereas non-binding conditions serve as markers for broader progress
assessment and non-implementation does not automatically suspend the loan (IMF
2001b), which may thus introduce noise to the analysis if included (Stubbs et al.
2017b). Our chosen measure also allows us to empirically isolate a conditionality effect
from an effect—or lack thereof—due to country non-compliance, since the binding
character of these conditions precludes the possibility of the latter (Dreher 2006;
Vreeland 2003, 2006). Since hypothesized pathways of impact entail both structural
and quantitative conditions, our initial measure of conditionality aggregates them. In
further analyses, we then test the disaggregated impact of conditions separated into
quantitative and structural types, and also explore the effect of conditions in given
policy areas. Our IMF participation variable is measured with a binary indicator for
whether a country was under an IMF program in a given calendar year for at least five
months of the year (Dreher 2006).
Following previous research (Clements et al. 2013; Huber et al. 2008; Stubbs and
Kentikelenis 2018), our outcome equation includes control variables for economic and
demographic factors that affect both the need for education expenditure and govern-
mental capacity to meet those needs. Entering the model contemporaneously are the
natural logarithm of GDP per capita, urban population as a share of total population,
population aged under 15 as a share of working-age population, and level of democ-
racy; while government balance as a share of GDP and trade as a share of GDP enter
the model lagged one year to correspond with the budget cycle. We expect a positive
effect of GDP per capita because, according to ‘Wagner’s Law’, state activities expand
to cover new administrative and social functions as economic development takes place,
thereby increasing state spending (Brady and Lee 2014; Nooruddin and Simmons
2006; Wagner 1994). Urbanization should have a positive effect since urban dwellers
can more easily mobilize to request additional services from governments as well as
offering economies of scale (Baqir 2002). The population under 15 accounts for the
demographic need for a government to spend on education (Huber et al. 2008).
Democracy controls for the well-established finding that democratic governments
increase public spending on social programs (Stasavage 2005). The government
balance in the previous year controls for a country’s fiscal space to increase education
spending (Clements et al. 2013). Last, we expect a positive effect of trade openness in
19 In robustness checks, we use alternative measures of conditionality: an implementation-corrected count
(which subtracts conditions waived by the IMF); an implementation-discounted count (which discounts
conditions during program suspensions); and a combined binding and non-binding condition count.
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the previous year because it can lead to increases in social expenditures as governments
seek to compensate those adversely affected by it (Rodrik 1998; Rudra 2008). We also
introduce country fixed effects to account for time-invariant country-level characteris-
tics, and year fixed effects to control for common external shocks across all countries.
Data sources and summary statistics are provided in the online appendices.
As described earlier, our identification strategy entails instrumenting the number of
conditions using the interaction of the within-country average of the number of
conditions with the natural log of the IMF liquidity ratio; and instrumenting program
participation with the interaction of the within-country average of program participation
with the natural log of the IMF liquidity ratio. We compare how results differ for
instrumental variable and control function approaches to endogeneity of IMF partici-
pation. The system of three simultaneous equations is estimated through MLE. Stan-
dard errors are calculated using the clustered Sandwich estimator, which adjusts for
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Analyses are performed using Stata version
15.
4.3 Findings
In Table 2, we present the results of our quantitative analyses on government education
expenditure as a share of GDP on six variants of our model. The online appendices
report results from the first-stage models for IMF conditionality and participation.
To ensure our model specification is appropriate, in Model 1 we initially include
only the control variables and conduct simple OLS estimation. Results on controls
follow the expected effect direction established by previous studies on government
education spending (Clements et al. 2013; Huber et al. 2008; Stubbs and Kentikelenis
2018): positive for urbanization, dependency ratio, democracy, and trade (although
only democracy is statistically significant); and negative for GDP per capita and
government balance (both statistically significant).20 For Model 2, we add the IMF
condition and participation variables, but again run simple OLS without any
endogeneity corrections. Here, none of our IMF variables reach standard thresholds
of statistical significance, and results on controls remain stable.
Next, we employ our preferred identification strategy in Models 3 and 4. As
described earlier, we correct for endogeneity of the number of conditions and program
participation in an instrumental variable approach using compound instruments: the
interaction of the within-country average of the number of conditions with the natural
log of the IMF liquidity ratio; and the interaction of the within-country average of IMF
program participation with the natural log of the IMF liquidity ratio. In Model 3, we
exclude potentially endogenous controls that could be affected by IMF intervention,
namely democracy, government balance, and trade. In this setting, exposure to an
additional IMF condition is associated with a statistically significant decrease of 0.05
percentage points in government education spending as a share of GDP. When we add
potentially endogenous controls in Model 4, the headline result is substantively un-
changed. The divergent findings from Model 2—which underestimates conditionality
20 Previous studies did not include both country and year fixed effects (Clements et al. 2013; Huber et al.
2008; Stubbs and Kentikelenis 2018). Our specification is thus a more stringent test, which may explain why
some of our controls do not reach standard thresholds of significance.
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How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality
effect size and statistical significance—indicates the presence of endogeneity. In
particular, the findings suggest that when government education spending is high,
either the Fund imposes or a country actively seeks more conditions.
Our finding on the statistically significant negative effect of IMF conditions is also
substantively significant. The mean and standard deviation of government education
spending as a share of GDP across our sample is 4.41 and 2.15 percent respectively;
thus, setting the number of conditions at its mean of 10.61 corresponds to an average
decrease of about quarter of a standard deviation in education spending, or 0.53
percentage points, all other factors held constant. Based on findings in Model 4, such
an effect is comparable to a four-point decline in democracy, using an ordinal scale
from zero (full autocracy) to ten (full democracy) (Teorell et al. 2016).
Outside of the conditionality channel, the IMF effect direction is negative but does
not reach standard thresholds of significance. Results on control variables maintain
their direction of effect, but government balance is no longer statistically significant in
Model 4. Diagnostic statistics indicate that our instruments are strong across Models 3
and 4: Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics of 33.63 and 35.93 respectively for the condition-
ality compound instrument; and 15.03 and 16.61 for the participation compound
instrument.21 The instruments are also jointly relevant in both models, with F-
statistics of 33.64 and 35.96 respectively.
For Models 5 and 6, we maintain an instrumental variable approach to correct for
endogeneity of conditionality, but employ a control function approach to correct for the
endogeneity of participation. Recall that this approach is more efficient and can still use
our compound instrument for IMF participation, but will not allow for the inclusion of
country fixed effects in the first-stage equation due to the incidental parameter problem
(Greene 2004). Model 5 again excludes potentially endogenous controls, while Model
6 includes the full list of controls. The main results are equivalent across both models:
exposure to an additional IMF condition is associated with a statistically significant
decrease of 0.07 percentage points in government education spending as a share of
GDP. Compared to Models 3 and 4, the effect of IMF conditions is accentuated and
reaches the higher significance threshold of p < 0.01. The IMF participation variable,
while now positive in direction, remains statistically non-significant. Control variables
are also qualitatively equivalent with the exception of a (non-significant) reversal of
effect on the government balance. The conditionality compound instrument remains
strong; and the first-stage probit shows the participation compound instrument is a
statistically significant predictor of IMF participation.
To recap our results thus far, we find a consistent negative effect of the total number
of IMF conditions on government education spending but no effect for other aspects of
IMF operations across multiple model specifications and identification strategies. To
demonstrate a potential avenue for future research, we investigate the impact of
disaggregated sets of conditions in Table 3. When disaggregating conditionality, care
must be taken to ensure all conditions are jointly included in a single model, so that the
effect of the residual conditions is not attributed to the condition type or policy area of
interest. Thus, we include two IMF conditionality variables in each model. Compound
instruments can be constructed for each condition count within a single model based on
the interaction of the within-country average of that condition type with the year-on-
21 As a rule of thumb, F-statistics on excluded instruments should be above ten (Staiger and Stock 1997).
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year IMF budget constraint. The online appendices report first-stage models for IMF
participation and both conditionality variables.
In Models 7 and 8, we test the impact of the number of conditions disaggregated into
structural and quantitative types using our two alternative identification strategies. Results
reveal that quantitative conditions yield a statistically significant negative effect in line
with our theoretical expectations, but only when we use a control function approach to
correct for endogeneity of IMF participation; however, structural conditions have a non-
significant negative association on bothmodels. The IMF participation variable also never
reaches standard thresholds of significance and fluctuates in effect direction across the two
models. Findings on controls remain consistent with previous models; and diagnostic
statistics indicate our compound instruments are strong throughout.
For the next set of models, we investigate the impact of specific policy-area
conditions.22 We examine, in Models 9 and 10, expenditure conditions using the same
identification strategies as the previous two models. Predicated on our earlier discussion
of pathways linking IMF conditionality to government education expenditure, we
expect these will constrain education spending. As a falsification test, in Models 11
and 12 we examine revenue conditions, which we expect will have no effect. Based on
our dataset coding, expenditure conditions include all those related to expenditure
administration, fiscal transparency, audits, budget preparation, domestic arrears, and
fiscal balance; revenue conditions include those related to customs administration, tax
policy, tax administration, and audits of private enterprises. The online appendices
provide additional details on how conditions are classified into policy areas.
The results confirm our theoretical expectations. Expenditure conditions are nega-
tively associated with government spending on education, and residual policy areas
exhibit no effect; whereas revenue conditions yield no association, and residual policy
areas are negatively associated with government spending on education. In particular,
each additional expenditure condition corresponds to at least a 0.47 percentage point
decrease in government education spending as a share of GDP. Setting the number of
expenditure conditions at the mean of 1.77 would thus result in a 0.83 percentage point
decrease in education spending, all other factors held constant. Outside of the condi-
tionality channel, the IMF effect direction again fluctuates but never reaches standard
thresholds of significance; and findings on control variables are also substantively
unchanged from previous models. Diagnostic statistics indicate that our compound
instruments are strong on all disaggregated condition counts except for those pertaining
to IMF revenue conditions in Models 11 and 12, with Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics of
9.52 and 8.90 respectively. It thus cannot be discounted that coefficients in these two
models may be biased. Our participation instrument is also strong throughout; and
where a control function approach is used, first-stage probit results show the partici-
pation compound instrument is a statistically significant predictor of IMF participation.
22 The differential impact of conditionality can be captured across a series of specific policy areas by including
a separate variable for the number of conditions requiring adoption of a specific policy area—such as anti-
corruption, stabilization, liberalization, deregulation, or privatization—along with a variable for the number of
all remaining conditions. We recommend the inclusion of one specific policy area per model to avoid issues of
multicollinearity between condition counts of different policy areas. For instance, liberalization conditions
tend to be accompanied by privatization conditions, so are highly correlated in analyses.
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4.4 Robustness checks
We perform a series of robustness checks, presented in Table 4. Results from the first-
stage models for IMF participation and conditionality are available in the online
appendices. One concern is that countries fail to carry out these conditions, which
would mean we erroneously attribute an effect to conditions that were never imple-
mented. While using a binding condition count largely circumvents this issue (as they
must be met in order for the program to continue), in some circumstances the IMF’s
Executive Board can grant waivers that allow countries to miss certain conditions
without having their program suspended (Pop-Eleches 2009; Stone 2004). We thus
deploy an implementation-corrected measure of conditionality, which deducts the
number of waivers from the total number of binding conditions, in order to account
for country compliance with conditions. Since the measure is not available beyond
2009, our sample period is reduced. As shown in Model 13, and using our preferred
identification strategy, exposure to additional IMF conditions is still associated with
decreases in government education spending at standard thresholds of significance, and
results on control variables remain consistent. Compound instruments also remain
strong. As an alternative, we instead adopt an implementation-discounted measure of
conditionality in Model 14. IMF staff conduct reviews of programs regularly, and in
case of non-implementation, the conclusion of these reviews are delayed. Thus, we
discount conditions during the interruption period to account for non-compliance, as
detailed in the online appendices; again, our sample does not extend beyond 2009. We
find that accounting for program delays does not substantively alter results.
Second, in the analyses thus far we focus on binding conditions, but it is plausible
that non-binding conditions may also have an effect on government education spend-
ing. In Model 15, we incorporate the number of binding and non-binding conditions
into our measure of conditionality. Results on control variables remain consistent, but
exposure to additional IMF conditions has an attenuated effect and no longer holds a
statistically significant relationship with decreases in government education spending—
consistent with the view that the inclusion of non-binding conditions introduces noise
to the analysis (Stubbs et al. 2017b).
Third, to alleviate further concerns over the excludability of our conditionality
instrument, we control for additional variables that may be driving the relationship
between the IMF budget constraint and education expenditure that are also correlated
with the country-specific average of conditionality. One possibility is donors’ changing
commitment to education via the development of new global initiatives, such as the
Global Partnership on Education or Goal 2 of the Millennium Development Goals (i.e.,
to achieve universal primary education). These kinds of initiatives could prompt
member countries to increase voluntary contributions to the IMF’s concessionary
account, thereby decreasing the IMF budget constraint; and the IMF might also assign
more conditions to countries with poor education outcomes. At the same time, donors
may also increase funding to countries with poor education performance, which could
result in more government education spending. To address this issue, in Model 16 we
control for the natural log of total education commitments of overseas development
assistance to the recipient country. Our sample is reduced by 20% due to missing data
on education aid. In this context, the effect size of IMF conditions is consistent with
previous models, but it does not reach standard thresholds of statistical significance
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since the loss of observations reduces the precision of our estimates; our compound
instrument for IMF participation is also slightly weak. We therefore re-run the analysis
in Model 17 using instead the more efficient control function approach to account for
endogeneity of IMF participation, finding IMF conditions have a statistically signifi-
cant negative association with government education spending but that our compound
instrument for IMF conditions is slightly weak.
Another possibility is that countries make policy decisions based on a process of
social comparison—or ‘competitive mimicry’—stemming from the pressure to remain
effective and efficient relative to relevant—or ‘role equivalent’—others in the global
system of states (Henisz et al. 2005). A country’s selection decision into an IMF
program could be prompted by the number of role-equivalent others currently partic-
ipating, which will impact the IMF’s budget constraint and—in turn—the country-
specific average of conditionality. At the same time, a country may expect competition
in the global system of states to intensify and expand when a greater number of role-
equivalent others are on IMF programs, and will therefore be more compelled to match
education spending levels with role-equivalent others. To account for this scenario, we
create 18 groups of role-equivalent countries by sub-dividing the six World Bank
regional groups (East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa) into
three World Bank income groups (low income, lower-middle income, and upper-
middle income). For each country, we then calculate the number of country-years that
role-equivalent countries spent under IMF participation in the past three years. When
we include this variable in Model 18, our findings are unchanged.
Fourth, we compare our main results against alternative instruments for IMF
participation. Past studies have shown that variables approximating geopolitical impor-
tance impact upon the decision to participate in IMF programs without necessarily
affecting most domestic economic or social outcomes of interest, though the LATE
might not be generalizable (Dreher et al. 2018). For instance, we know that allies of big
powers receive favorable treatment by international financial institutions (Barro and
Lee 2005; Dreher and Gassebner 2012; Steinwand and Stone 2008; Thacker 1999;
Woo 2013). In Model 19, we thus deploy UNGA voting similarities with the US as an
instrument for IMF participation instead of our compound instrument. Results remain
consistent but the UNGA instrument is relatively weak. An alternative candidate
variable for geopolitical importance is temporary membership in the United Nations
Security Council (Dreher et al. 2009; Moser and Sturm 2011; Woo 2013), since major
shareholders of the IMF may care about how countries vote and some countries are
willing to trade their votes for IMF loans (Dreher et al. 2009). Using this variable as an
instrument for IMF participation in Model 20 does not substantively alter results—and
the instrument does not appear to be valid.
Fifth, we adopt alternative instruments to account for the endogeneity of condition-
ality in Model 21. As well as being determinants of IMF participation, UNGA voting
similarities with the US and UNSC temporary membership are identified as potential
determinants of conditionality that are plausibly exogenous with regard to government
education spending (Caraway et al. 2012; Chwieroth 2015; Dreher and Jensen 2007;
Dreher et al. 2015; Nelson 2014). Countries aligned with the US tend to receive more
favorable treatment from the IMF and may thus receive fewer conditions; and major
shareholders of the IMF may advocate softer conditionality in return for political
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influence over the UNSC. Using this strategy, we find a highly negative effect on
government education spending of IMF intervention outside of the conditionality
channel, but no statistically significant effect of IMF conditions. Little can be read into
this result, however, because our conditionality instruments are weak, with a combined
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of 2.76. This reinforces the value of our preferred com-
pound instrumentation approach to examining the effects of IMF conditionality.
5 Conclusions
This article offered a new strategy for estimating the effects of IMF programs by
incorporating fine-grained data on IMF-mandated policy reforms, or conditionality.
The release of such data has enabled scholars to overcome two frequently evoked
criticisms of earlier studies: that they treat the policy content of programs as homoge-
nous; and that they do not delineate the effects of conditionality from other pathways of
program influence. In so doing, the new data introduces methodological challenges
linked to the inclusion of multiple endogenous IMF variables. After a review of existing
quantitative approaches, we advocated that future studies utilize MLE over a system of
three simultaneous equations, in effect combining the following: (a) an instrumental
variable approach to account for endogeneity of IMF program participation, using the
interaction of the within-country average of IMF program participation with the natural
log of the IMF liquidity ratio as an excludable instrument; and (b) an instrumental
variable approach to account for endogeneity of IMF conditionality, using the interac-
tion of the within-country average of the number of conditions with the natural log of the
IMF liquidity ratio as an excludable instrument. Monte Carlo simulations confirmed that
our approach to addressing endogeneity is unbiased and performs better than the
alternatives, provided that instruments are not weak. Applying our approach, we found
that over the last two decades IMF conditions decreased government education spending
in developing countries, consistent with expectations from past studies.
We note three main shortcomings of our approach. First, using the number of
conditions as a measure of conditionality may not accurately reflect the true
burden of conditionality, since it does not capture the relative difficulty of
implementing any individual condition. By way of compromise, subsequent
studies could consider how to incorporate the scope of conditionality—that is,
the number of policy areas subject to conditionality—in addition to the number
of conditions. Second, while our method enriches our understanding of the
consequences of conditionality, it tells us less about the effect of IMF technical
assistance. Our study utilized a dummy variable for the presence of a Fund-
supported program to capture the effect of technical assistance, thereby—and in
similar vein to criticisms made about the inability of earlier studies to encapsu-
late heterogeneous policy content—masking diverse country experiences that
may, in turn, affect the outcome of interest. This markedly under-researched
phenomenon represents the most promising avenue for future research to pursue.
Third, compound instrumentation is no panacea. The approach is useful for
identification when no obvious (non-compound) instrument is available, but
researchers should verify to the extent possible that underlying assumptions hold.
The core assumptions include (1) monotonicity of treatment (i.e., changes in the
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outcome in countries with different probability of IMF programs and mean
number of IMF conditions—in short, IMF treatment variables—are not affected
differently by changes in the IMF’s budget constraint, other than via IMF
programs and IMF conditionality, respectively); (2) parallel trends (i.e., the
trends in IMF treatment variables and the outcome are similar across countries
with above-mean exposure and below-mean exposure to IMF treatments); and (3)
non-overlapping trends (i.e., non-linear trends in these variables for above-mean
exposure countries do not overlap with the trend in the IMF’s budget constraint).
Why should scholars prefer our approach over others when evaluating IMF pro-
grams? Our strategy has the advantage of offering an excludable instrument for
conditionality which can—and should—be varied as needed for specific applications
to conditionality policy areas, as we demonstrated with IMF expenditure and revenue
conditions. Our approach also allows us to isolate where an effect is derived from
among the conditions, promising greater nuance on policy advice. For instance, the
results of our empirical application suggest that IMF programs should specifically
reduce expenditure conditions if government spending on education is to be increased.
Taken together, our approach enables scholars to draw more complete interpretations
on the consequences of IMF programs. Even so, it is worth bearing in mind that any
approach to endogeneity does not absolve scholars from thinking carefully about the
underlying data-generating processes and making decisions based on strong theoretical
foundations (Chaudoin et al. 2016).
Our methods are also transferable to studies on the effects of other organizations that
engage in conditional program lending, such as the World Bank, regional development
banks, the European Union, or large bilateral donors. Indeed, studying the effects of
these programs is essential if we wish to better understand processes of change. As
interest in the IMF—and other international financial institutions—continues to grow,
so too will the available data sources and the attendant body of research around it. If we
are to make the most of these developments, it is imperative that we revisit the
methodologies used to estimate their consequences, paying attention to basic dictums
of econometric analysis and the challenges of endogeneity. Until and unless we do, our
knowledge of how these international organizations impact social, economic, or polit-
ical outcomes will suffer.
Acknowledgements We thank Michael Ash, Manu Savani, Veronica Toffolutti, and participants at the
Global Economic Governance conference at the University of Cambridge for helpful comments; and Valentin
Lang for providing us with the IMF liquidity data. We also thank the three anonymous reviewers and Axel
Dreher for their close reading and incisive criticism. The usual disclaimers apply.
Funding The authors gratefully acknowledge funding by the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET
Grant INO13–00020: ‘The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment’), the Cambridge Political Economy
Society Trust, and the Centre for Business Research at the University of Cambridge.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality
References
Abouharb, M. R., & Cingranelli, D. L. (2009). IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003. Review of
International Organizations, 4, 47–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-008-9050-5.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an
application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297. https://doi.
org/10.2307/2297968.
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components
models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01642-D.
Atoyan, R., & Conway, P. (2006). Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and
instrumental-variable estimators. Review of International Organizations, 1(2), 99–124. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11558-006-6612-2.
Augurzky, B., & Kluve, J. (2007). Assessing the performance of matching algorithms when selection into
treatment is strong. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(3), 533–557. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.919.
Babb, S. (2005). The social consequences of structural adjustment: Recent evidence and current debates.
Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 199–222. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.31.041304.122258.
Babb, S., & Buira, A. (2005). Mission creep, mission push and discretion: The case of IMF conditionality. In
A. Buira (Ed.), The IMF and World Bank at sixty (pp. 59–83). London: Anthem Press.
Babb, S., & Kentikelenis, A. (2018). International financial institutions as agents of neoliberalism. In D.
Cahill, M. Cooper, M. Konings, & D. Primrose (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of neoliberalism (pp. 16–27).
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
Bal Gündüz, Y. (2016). The economic impact of short-term IMF engagement in low-income countries. World
Development, 87, 30–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.04.012.
Baqir, R. (2002). Social sector spending in a panel of countries. IMF Working Paper No. 35. Washington,
DC.
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J.-W. (2005). IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects? Journal of
Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1245–1269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.003.
Bas, M., & Stone, R. W. (2014). Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs. Review of International
Organizations, 9, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-013-9173-1.
Beazer, Q. H., & Woo, B. (2016). IMF conditionality, government partisanship, and the progress of economic
reforms. American Journal of Political Science, 60(2), 304–321. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12200.
Bell, A., & Jones, K. (2015). Explaining fixed effects: Random effects modeling of time-series cross-sectional
and panel data. Political Science Research and Methods, 3, 133–153. https://doi.org/10.1017
/psrm.2014.7.
Bird, G. (2009). Reforming IMF conditionality: From “streamlining” to “major overhaul.”.World Economics,
10(3), 81–104.
Blanton, R. G., Blanton, S. L., & Peksen, D. (2015). The impact of IMF and World Bank programs on labor
rights. Political Research Quarterly, 68(2), 324–336. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915578462.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models.
Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8.
Brady, D., & Lee, H. Y. (2014). The rise and fall of government spending in affluent democracies, 1971-2008.
Journal of European Social Policy, 24, 56–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928713511281.
Broome, A., & Seabrooke, L. (2015). Shaping policy curves: Cognitive authority in transnational capacity
building. Public Administration, 93(4), 956–972. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12179.
Bulír, A., & Moon, S. (2004). Is fiscal adjustment more durable when the IMF is involved? Comparative
Economic Studies, 46(3), 373–399. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100051.
Bun, M. J. G., & Harrison, T. D. (2018). OLS and IV estimation of regression models including endogenous
interaction terms. Econometric Reviews, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/07474938.2018.1427486.
Butkiewicz, J., & Yanikkaya, H. (2005). The effects of IMF and World Bank lending on long-run economic
growth: An empirical analysis. World Development, 33(3), 371–391. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2004.09.006.
Caraway, T. L., Rickard, S. J., & Anner, M. S. (2012). International negotiations and domestic politics: The
case of IMF labor market conditionality. International Organization, 66(1), 27–61. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0020818311000348.
Carter, D. B., & Stone, R. W. (2015). Democracy and multilateralism: The case of vote buying in the UN
general assembly. International Organization, 69, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000186.
Casper, B. A. (2017). IMF programs and the risk of a coup d’etat. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(5), 964–
996. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715600759.
Stubbs T. et al.
Chang, H.-J. (2007). Bad Samaritans: The myth of free trade and the secret history of capitalism. New York:
Bloomsbury Press.
Chapman, T., Fang, S., Li, X., & Stone, R. W. (2017). Mixed signals: IMF lending and capital markets. British
Journal of Political Science, 47(2), 329–349. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000216.
Chaudoin, S., Hays, J., & Hicks, R. (2016). Do we really know the WTO cures cancer? British Journal of
Political Science., 48, 903–928. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600034X.
Christian, P., & Barrett, C. B. (2017). Revisiting the effect of food aid on conflict: A methodological caution.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8171. Washington, DC.
Chwieroth, J. M. (2015). Professional ties that bind: How normative orientations shape IMF conditionality.
Review of International Political Economy, 22(4), 757–787. https://doi.org/10.1080
/09692290.2014.898214.
Clements, B., Gupta, S., & Nozaki, M. (2013). What happens to social spending in IMF-supported
programmes? Applied Economics, 48(28), 4022–4033. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2012.744136.
Copelovitch, M. (2010a). Master or servant? Common agency and the political economy of IMF lending.
International Studies Quarterly, 54, 49–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00577.x.
Copelovitch, M. (2010b). The International Monetary Fund in the global economy: Banks, Bonds, and
Bailouts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crivelli, E., & Gupta, S. (2016). Does conditionality in IMF-supported programs promote revenue reform?
International Tax and Public Finance, 23(3), 550–579. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-015-9379-7.
Dawson, T. C. (2002). Stiglitz, the IMF and globalization. Retrieved December 6, 2016, from http://www.imf.
org/external/np/speeches/2002/061302.htm
Diamond, A., & Sekhon, J. S. (2013). Genetic matching for estimating causal effects: A general multivariate
matching method for achieving balance in observational studies. Review of Economics and Statistics,
95(3), 932–945. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00318.
Dreher, A. (2006). IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with
conditionality. World Development, 34(5), 769–788. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.002.
Dreher, A. (2009). IMF conditionality: Theory and evidence. Public Choice, 141, 233–267. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11127-009-9486-z.
Dreher, A., & Gassebner, M. (2012). Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? An
empirical analysis. International Organization, 66(2), 329–358. https://doi.org/10.1017
/S0020818312000094.
Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2007). Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of U.S.
interests on International Monetary Fund conditions. Journal of Law and Economics, 50, 105–124.
https://doi.org/10.1086/508311.
Dreher, A., & Lang, V. F. (2019). The political economy of international organizations. In R. D. Congleton, B.
N. Grofman, & S. Voigt (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of public choice, volume 2. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Dreher, A., & Langlotz, S. (2017). Aid and growth: New evidence using an excludable instrument. Discussion
Paper No. 635. Heidelberg.
Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. (2004). The causes and consequences of IMF conditionality. Emerging Markets
Finance and Trade, 40(3), 26–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2004.11052571.
Dreher, A., & Walter, S. (2010). Does the IMF help or hurt? The effect of IMF programs on the likelihood and
outcome of currency crises. World Development, 38, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2009.05.007.
Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2009). Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United
Nations security council. European Economic Review, 53(7), 742–757. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
euroecorev.2009.03.002.
Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2015). Politics and IMF conditionality. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 59, 120–148. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713499723.
Dreher, A., Eichenauer, V. Z., & Gehring, K. (2018). Geopolitics, aid, and growth: The impact of UN security
council membership on the effectiveness of aid. World Bank Economic Review, 32(2), 268–286.
https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhw037.
Easterly, W. (2005). What did structural adjustment adjust? The association of policies and growth with
repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans. Journal of Development Economics, 76, 1–22.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.11.005.
Garuda, G. (2000). The distributional effects of IMF programs: A cross-country analysis.World Development,
28(6), 1031–1051. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00002-4.
Gould, E. (2003). Money talks: Supplementary financiers and International Monetary Fund conditionality.
International Organization, 57(3), 551–586. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573039.
How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality
Grabel, I. (2011). Not your grandfather’s IMF: Global crisis, “productive incoherence” and developmental
policy space. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35(5), 805–830. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/ber012.
Greene, W. (2004). Fixed effects and bias due to the incidental parameters problem in the Tobit model.
Econometric Reviews, 23(2), 125–147. https://doi.org/10.1081/ETC-120039606.
Hainmueller, J., Mummolo, J., & Xu, Y. (2016). How much should we trust estimates from multiplicative
interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical practice. Working Paper. Palo Alto, CA.
Hardoy, I. (2003). Effect of IMF programmes on growth: A reappraisal using the method of matching.
Working Paper. Oslo.
Hartzell, C. A., Hoddie, M., & Bauer, M. E. (2010). Economic liberalization via IMF structural adjustment:
Sowing the seeds of civil war? International Organization, 64(2), 339–356. https://doi.org/10.1017
/S0020818310000068.
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica, 47, 153–161. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1912352.
Henisz, W. J., Zelner, B. A., & Guillén, M. F. (2005). The worldwide diffusion of market-oriented infrastruc-
ture reform, 1977-1999. American Sociological Review, 70(6), 871–897. https://doi.org/10.1177
/000312240507000601.
Huber, E., Mustillo, T., & Stephens, J. (2008). Politics and social spending in Latin America. Journal of
Politics, 70(2), 420–436. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608080407.
IEO (2003). Fiscal adjustment in IMF-supported programs.Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Office
of the International Monetary Fund.
IEO (2007). Structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs.Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation
Office of the International Monetary Fund.
IMF (1997). Azerbaijan Republic: Request for second annual arrangement under the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility, and second review under the Extended Arrangement.Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund.
IMF (1998). Benin: Request for the second annual arrangement under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (1999). Bolivia: Staff report for the 1999 article IV consultation and request for second annual
arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund.
IMF (2000a). Benin: Request for arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Washington,
DC: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2000b). Nicaragua: First and second reviews under the second annual arrangemnet under the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility and request for waiver of performance criteria. Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2001a). Managing Directors’ report to the International Monetary and Financial Committee—
Streamlining conditionality and enhancing ownership. Retrieved January 25, 2017, from https://www.
imf.org/external/np/omd/2001/110601.htm
IMF (2001b). Structural conditionality in Fund-supported programs. Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund.
IMF (2002). Sierra Leone: Second review under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and request for a
waiver of performance criterion. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2003). Republic of Tajikistan: Second review under the three-year arrangement under the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility, and request for a waiver of performance criterion. Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2004). Signaling by the Fund: A historical review. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2006). Bulgaria: Second review under the Stand-By Arrangement and requests for waiver of perfor-
mance criteria and postponement of third review. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2015). IMF conditionality. RetrievedMay 11, 2015, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm
IMF (2016a). Corruption: Costs and mitigating strategies. IMF Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/16/05.
Washington, DC.
IMF (2016b). Where the IMF gets its money. Retrieved February 11, 2017, from http://www.imf.
org/en/About/Factsheets/Where-the-IMF-Gets-Its-Money
IMF (2017a). IMF Quotas. Retrieved January 11, 2018, from http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016
/07/14/12/21/IMF-Quotas
IMF (2017b). Social safeguards and program design in PRGTand PSI-supported programs. Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
Stubbs T. et al.
Ivanova, A., Mayer, W., Mourmouras, A., & Anayiotos, G. (2006). What determines the implementation of
IMF-supported programs? In A. Mody & A. Rebucci (Eds.), IMF-supported programs: Recent staff
research (pp. 160–188). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Kentikelenis, A. (2017). Structural adjustment and health: A conceptual framework and evidence on path-
ways. Social Science & Medicine, 187, 296–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.02.021.
Kentikelenis, A., & Seabrooke, L. (2017). The politics of world polity: Script-writing in international
organizations. American Sociological Review, 82(5), 1065–1092. https://doi.org/10.1177
/0003122417728241.
Kentikelenis, A., Stubbs, T., & King, L. (2015). Structural adjustment and public spending on health:
Evidence from IMF programs in low-income countries. Social Science & Medicine, 126, 169–176.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.12.027.
Kentikelenis, A., Stubbs, T., & King, L. (2016). IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–
2014. Review of International Political Economy, 23(4), 543–582. https://doi.org/10.1080
/09692290.2016.1174953.
King, G., & Nielsen, R. (2018). Why propensity scores should not be used for matching. Working Paper.
Cambridge, MA.
Lang, V. F. (2016). The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality.
Discussion Paper No. 617. Heidelberg.
Marphatia, A. A. (2010). The adverse effects of International Monetary Fund programs on the health and
education workforce. International Journal of Health Services, 40, 165–178. https://doi.org/10.2190
/HS.40.1.j.
Morgan, S., & Winship, C. (2007). Counterfactuals and causal inference: Methods and principles for social
research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moser, C., & Sturm, J.-E. (2011). Explaining IMF lending decisions after the cold war. Review of International
Organizations, 6(3), 307–340. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9120-y.
Mukherjee, B., & Singer, D. (2010). International institutions and domestic compensation: The IMF and the
politics of capital account liberalization. American Journal of Political Science, 54, 45–60. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00417.x.
Nelson, S. C. (2014). Playing favorites: How shared beliefs shape the IMF’s lending decisions. International
Organization, 68(2), 297–328. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000477.
Nelson, S. C., & Wallace, G. P. R. (2017). Are IMF lending programs good or bad for democracy? Review of
International Organizations, 12(4), 523–558. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9250-3.
Nielsen, R., & Sheffield, J. (2009). Matching with time-series cross-sectional data. Polmeth XXVI Working
Paper. New Haven, CT.
Nizalova, O. Y., & Murtazashvili, I. (2016). Exogenous treatment and endogenous factor: Vanishing of
omitted variable bias on the interaction term. Journal of Econometric Methods, 5(1), 71–77. https://doi.
org/10.1515/jem-2013-0012.
Nooruddin, I., & Simmons, J. W. (2006). The politics of hard choices: IMF programs and government
spending. International Organization, 60(4), 1001–1033. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060334.
Nsouli, S., Atoyan, R., & Mourmouras, A. (2006). Institutions, program implementation, and macroeconomic
performance. In A. Mody & A. Rebucci (Eds.), IMF-supported programs: Recent staff research (pp. 140–
159). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Nunn, N., & Qian, N. (2014). US food aid and civil conflict. American Economic Review, 104(6), 1630–1666.
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.6.1630.
Oberdabernig, D. (2013). Revisiting the effects of IMF programs on poverty and inequality. World
Development, 46, 113–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.033.
Pop-Eleches, G. (2009). Public goods or political pandering: Evidence from IMF programs in Latin America
and Eastern Europe. International Studies Quarterly, 53(3), 787–816. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2478.2009.00556.x.
Przeworski, A., & Vreeland, J. R. (2000). The effect of IMF programs on economic growth. Journal of
Development Economics, 62(2), 385–421. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00090-0.
Reinsberg, B., Kentikelenis, A., Stubbs, T., & King, L. (2018). The world system and the hollowing-out of
state capacity in developing countries: How structural adjustment programs impact bureaucratic quality.
American Journal of Sociology, 124(3).
Rickard, S., & Caraway, T. (2014). International negotiations in the shadow of national elections. International
Organization, 68(3), 701–720. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000058.
Rickard, S., & Caraway, T. (2018). International demands for austerity: Examining the impact of the IMF on
the public sector. Review of International Organizations. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9295-y.
How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality
Rodrik, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments? Journal of Political Economy,
106(5), 997–1032. https://doi.org/10.1086/250038.
Roodman, D. (2009a). A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 71, 135–158. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2008.00542.x.
Roodman, D. (2009b). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. Stata
Journal, 9, 86–136.
Roodman, D. (2010). Squishy findings on aid fungibility. Retrieved June 29, 2015, from http://www.cgdev.
org/blog/squishy-findings-aid-fungibility
Roodman, D. (2011). Fitting fully observed recusive mixed-process models with cmp. Stata Journal, 11(2),
159–206.
Rudra, N. (2008). Globalization and the race to the bottom in developing countries: Who really gets hurt?
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sartori, A. E. (2003). An estimator for some binary-outcome selection models without exclusion restrictions.
Political Analysis, 11(2), 111–138. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpg001.
Simmons, B., Dobbin, F., & Garrett, G. (2008). The global diffusion of markets and democracy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Smets, L., & Knack, S. (2016). World Bank lending and the quality of economic policy. Journal of
Development Studies, 52, 72–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2015.1068290.
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica,
65(3), 557. https://doi.org/10.2307/2171753.
Stasavage, D. (2005). Democracy and education spending in Africa. American Journal of Political Science,
49(2), 343–358. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00127.x.
Steinwand, M. C., & Stone, R. W. (2008). The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence.
Review of International Organizations, 3(2), 123–149. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-007-9026-x.
Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York: W. W. Norton.
Stone, R. W. (2002). Lending credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the post-communist transi-
tion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stone, R. W. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. American Political Science Review,
98(4), 577–591. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540404136X.
Stone, R. W. (2008). The scope of IMF conditionality. International Organization, 62(4), 589–620. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0020818308080211.
Stone, R. W. (2011). Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Stubbs, T., & Kentikelenis, A. (2018). Targeted social safeguards in the age of universal social protection: The
IMF and health systems of low-income countries. Critical Public Health, 28(2), 132–139. https://doi.
org/10.1080/09581596.2017.1340589.
Stubbs, T., Kentikelenis, A., & King, L. (2016). Catalyzing aid? The IMF and donor behavior in aid allocation.
World Development, 78, 511–528. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.010.
Stubbs, T., Kentikelenis, A., Stuckler, D., McKee, M., & King, L. (2017a). The IMF and government health
expenditure: A response to Sanjeev Gupta. Social Science & Medicine, 181, 202–204. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.03.050.
Stubbs, T., Kentikelenis, A., Stuckler, D., McKee, M., & King, L. (2017b). The impact of IMF conditionality
on government health expenditure: A cross-national analysis of 16 west African nations. Social Science &
Medicine, 174, 220–227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.12.016.
Stuckler, D., Basu, S., & McKee, M. (2011). International Monetary Fund and aid displacement. International
Journal of Health Services, 41, 67–76. https://doi.org/10.2190/HS.41.1.e.
Stuckler, D., King, L., & McKee, M. (2012). The disappearing health effects of rapid privatisation: A case of
statistical obscurantism? Social Science & Medicine, 75, 23–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
socscimed.2011.12.054.
Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Khomenko, A., & Svensson, R. (2016). The Quality of
Government Standard Data: Version January 2016. Retrieved February 5, 2016, from http://qog.pol.gu.
se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata
Thacker, S. (1999). The high politics of IMF lending. World Politics, 52, 38–75. https://doi.org/10.1017
/S0043887100020025.
Thomson, S. (2015). Economic crisis, health systems and health in Europe: Impact and implications for
policy. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
Vaubel, R. (1996). Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A comparison of the evidence. The World
Economy, 19(2), 195–210. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.1996.tb00672.x.
Stubbs T. et al.
Vreeland, J. R. (2002). The effect of IMF programs on labor. World Development, 30, 121–139. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00101-2.
Vreeland, J. R. (2003). The IMF and economic development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vreeland, J. R. (2006). IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies.
Review of International Organizations, 1(4), 359–378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-006-0161-6.
Vreeland, J. R. (2007). The International Monetary Fund: Politics of conditional lending. London: Routledge.
Wagner, A. (1994). Three extracts on public finance. In R. A. Musgrave & A. T. Peacock (Eds.), Classics in
the theory of public finance (pp. 1–15). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wei, S.-J., & Zhang, Z. (2010). Do external interventions work? The case of trade reform conditions in IMF
supported programs. Journal of Development Economics, 92, 71–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jdeveco.2008.11.008.
Winship, C., & Mare, R. D. (1992). Models for sample selection bias. Annual Review of Sociology, 18(1),
327–350. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.18.080192.001551.
Woo, B. (2013). Conditional on conditionality: IMF program design and foreign direct investment.
International Interactions, 39(3), 292–315. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.782303.
Woods, N. (2006). The globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Wooldridge, J. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data (2nd ed.). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wooldridge, J. (2012). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach (5th ed.). Mason, Ohio: Cengage
Learning.
Wooldridge, J. (2015). Control function methods in applied econometrics. Journal of Human Resources,
50(2), 420–445. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.2.420.
World Bank. (2016). World Development Indicators. Retrieved February 5, 2016, from http://data.worldbank.
org
Young, A. (2018). Consistency without inference: Instrumental variables in practical application. Working
Paper. London.
Affiliations
Thomas Stubbs1,2 & Bernhard Reinsberg2,3 & Alexander Kentikelenis4 & Lawrence
King5
Bernhard Reinsberg
bernhard.reinsberg@glasgow.ac.uk
Alexander Kentikelenis
alexander.kentikelenis@unibocconi.it
Lawrence King
lpking@econs.umass.edu
1 Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, London, UK
2 Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
3 School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
4 Department of Social and Political Sciences, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy
5 Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, USA
Lawrence King5
How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality
